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1. Introdution
A ooperative game onsists of a nite set of players N , alled the grand oali-
tion, and a harateristi funtion V : 2N → R that maps the set of all possible oali-
tions to the set of real numbers and whih satises the ondition V (∅) = 0. The fun-
tion V (S) desribes the worth or power of a oalition, i.e., how muh olletive payo
a set of players S an gain by forming a oalition. Thus the harateristi funtion is
a key omponent of a ooperative game (see, e.g., Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953).
The ruial issue here is the way the players from oalition S interat with the
rest of players from the set N \ S. The analysis of suh an interation is the main
ontribution of the paper.
Nowadays, there exist dierent approahes to alulate the harateristi fun-
tion in a ooperative game. Some of them are desribed in (Reddy and Zaour,
2014) with a modern view on the subjet for the stati formulation. For the dynami
formulation, the onstrution of the so-alled α- (Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953)
and δ- harateristi funtions (see (Petrosjan and Danilov, 1982) and (Petrosjan
and Zaour, 2003)) was analyzed in (Gromova and Petrosyan, 2017) where an ap-
proah for the onstrution of a ζ-harateristi funtion was introdued (see also
(Petrosyan and Gromova, 2014) for the rst referene in Russian).
In (Gromova and Marova, 2018a; Gromova et al., 2020) a ζ- harateristi fun-
tion was introdued, and a new harateristi of players' behavior, referred to as
the reation measure, was dened. This measure shows the eet of the hoie of
strategies by the players from oalition S and anti-oalition N \ S to the payo of
oalition S. Moreover, we onsider a new type of interation in whih the players
from oalition S do not reat to the behavior of players from N \ S and use their
strategies from the optimal prole (whih for n players orresponds to the maximal
total payo), while the players from N \S do not reat to the players from S as well
⋆
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and use their strategies from the Nash equilibrium (alulated for all n players). In
this way, we introdue a new harateristi funtion whih is tehnially muh easier
to onstrut. Its properties were studied in a general setting, and it was onluded
that the new funtion an be used as a substitute for the lassial α-harateristi
funtion.
A systemati overview of α-, δ-, ζ- and η-harateristi funtion and their prop-
erties is presented in (Gromova et al., 2020).
This paper provides an interdisiplinary analysis of α-, δ-, ζ- and η-harateristi
funtion from the mathematial and philosophial perspetives on the base of the
type of oalition S and anti-oalition N \ S interation.
The most essential tool for understanding the mehanisms of behavior of soial
groups is not the study of eonomially rational patterns of using various resoures,
but rather the study of the it ethis of behavior, whih is largely based on belonging
to a partiular religious onept.
Soiety in its development is hanging under the inuene of various fators. One
of them is a new religion. Introduing itself into the onsiousness of people, religion
instills new stereotypes of attitude towards oneself and others, thus leading to the
gradual destrution of old ties and soial ommunities and the formation of new
ones. It may seem that the mehanism of ation of religious ideas on various spheres
of soiety is very omplex and diult to desribe using reasonably simple models.
Nevertheless, with the development of soial philosophy and soiology, studies began
to appear that showed the possibility of a rational and straightforward desription
of the inuene of religious beliefs on people's behavior.
In this paper, an attempt is made to ompare mathematial models orrespond-
ing to dierent methods of onstruting a harateristi funtion in a ooperative
game, and models of soial philosophy that explain various stereotypes of interation
between soial groups and soiety.
2. Mathematial Problem Statement
Currently, game theory distinguishes between a large number of game types,
(Petrosyan et al., 2012). However, non-ooperative and ooperative games are fun-
damentally dierent in terms of the spei tasks being solved. When studying the
optimal behavior of players in non-ooperative games, these games are usually on-
sidered in normal form, that is, as a system Γ =< N, {Xi}i∈N , {Ki}i∈N >, where
N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of players, Xi is the set of ith player strategies, Ki is
the payo funtion of the ith player dened on X =
n∏
i=1
Xi. The onit of interests
omes from the fat that eah player i, i ∈ N , solves the task of hoosing one of
the strategies ui ∈ Xi that maximizes the payo Ki of this player, whih depends,
among other things, on the seleted strategies of other players. In this sense, the
approah to solving the range of tasks in a non-ooperative formulation of the game
an be alled strategi (Petrosjan and Danilov, 1982).
In a ooperative setting, all players agree to at together optimally (ooper-
atively) before the start of the game, i.e. they agree to use optimal strategies




der rather weak restritions on the problem, it is simple enough to nd optimal
strategies ū = (ū1, ū2, . . . , ūn). In the ooperative version of the game, the main
task of onit nature is the problem of a fair division of V (N) between players. In
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this regard, the approah to solving problems in ooperative games an be alled
non-strategi, emphasizing that the problem of nding optimal strategies is not of
a oniting nature and is not the main one.
The determination of the set of imputations is based on the funtion V (·),
whih is alled the harateristi funtion (Pehersky and Yanovskaya, 2004). In
the general ase, a ooperative game is dened as a pair < N, V (·) >, where N =
{1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of players, V (S), S ⊆ N is a harateristi funtion dened
on the set of admissible oalitions. Initially, the value of the harateristi funtion
V (S) was interpreted as the maximum guaranteed payo of the oalition S that it
an reeive by ating independently of other players (Petrosjan and Danilov, 1982,
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953). However, at the moment, under the harater-
isti funtion, as a rule, is meant a mapping that puts in orrespondene with any
admissible oalition S a value showing the strength of this oalition (Pehersky
and Yanovskaya, 2004).
Now onsider dierent interation models of the oalition S and the remaining
players from N \ S.
2.1. α-harateristi funtion
A lassial approah of onstrution the harateristi funtion is alled the
α-harateristi funtion. It was introdued in (Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953)
and was the only way to onstrut a ooperative game for a long time. The main
idea of this method is using the lower value of the zero-sum game ΓS,N\S between














Ki(u), S ⊆ N. (1)
We assume that the maximum and minimum are ahieved in (1). The value
V α(S) is interpreted as the maximum value that oalition S an get when the N \S
ats against S.
2.2. δ-harateristi funtion
The tehnique of onstrution the δ-harateristi funtion was proposed in (Pet-
rosjan and Zaour, 2003). The proess of alulation of this funtion onsists of two
steps. Firstly, one has to alulate the Nash equilibrium strategies for all players.
Seondly, players from S maximize their total payo
∑
i∈S Ki while players from















N\S), S ⊆ N. (2)
This form of the harateristi funtion requires fewer omputational operations
omparing with α-harateristi funtion. Additionally, previously onstruted the
Nash equilibrium simplies the omputation of V δ(S). Moreover, (2) has a pratial,
eonomial interpretation. Players not from the oalition S do not trend to form
anti-oalition N \ S in real models.
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2.3. ζ-harateristi funtion
The ζ-harateristi funtion was introdued in (Gromova and Petrosyan, 2017).
The rst step of alulation of this harateristi funtion for oalition S is nding
optimal ontrols maximizing the total payo of the players. On the seond step
players from the oalition S use the optimal ooperative strategies while the left-
















S , uN\S), S ⊆ N.
(3)
The onstruted V ζ(S) is superadditive in general (Gromova and Petrosyan,
2017). Additionally, already omputed optimal ontrols are used for ζ-harateristi
funtion whih simplies the omputation proess omparing with α-harateristi
funtion. Besides, these ontrols exist and ould be found for a wide lass of games
under rather weak onstraints. Lastly, ζ-harateristi funtion is appliable for
games with xed oalition strutures (Petrosyan and Gromova, 2014).
2.4. η-harateristi funtion
The idea of η-harateristi funtion was presented in (Gromova and Marova,
2018a). This harateristi funtion bases on strategies from the optimal prole u∗
and strategies from the Nash equilibrium uNE. We will use u∗S for players from S (as













N\S), S ⊆ N.
(4)
This funtion models the ase when players from N \S deide instead of optimal
strategies use strategies from the Nash equilibrium uNE.
Constrution of η-harateristi funtion has some tehnial advantages. It is
muh simpler in terms of alulation omparing with α-harateristi funtion. As
mentioned above, optimal ontrols exist and ould be found for a wide lass of
games. The drawbak of this funtion is the problem of existene and uniqueness of
Nash equilibrium solution (Gromova et al., 2020).
3. Philosophial Interpretation of Coalition and Anti-oalition
Interation
The mathematial methods for assessing oalition strength that are desribed
above an be interpreted in terms of soial philosophy. One of the most important
fators explaining the behavior of soial groups of people is their belonging to one
or another religious group and its fundamental onept, i.e. stereotypes of behavior
that determine the interation of members of this group with the outside world. It
is worth noting that the division based on belonging to a partiular ideology is also
responsible for the nature of the relationship of the surrounding world with this
group, i.e., this proess is not one-sided.
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3.1. α and δ harateristi funtions
A lassi example of a study of the inuene of religious beliefs on human be-
havior is Max Weber's book (Weber, 1905) The Protestant Ethis and the Spirit
of Capitalism (Die protestantishe Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, 1905).
Weber was able to explain why the ountries with Protestant religiosity in the 17-
19 enturies ahieved muh greater eonomi development than the ountries that
retained Catholi religiosity. As Weber showed, suh onepts as divine predesti-
nation and salvation of the soul, far from eonomi life, in their understanding,
harateristi of Protestantism, had a fundamental impat on the eonomi ethis
of Protestants. Furthermore, this in turn determined ompletely dierent forms of
eonomi life and the pae of development of Protestant ountries in omparison to
the Catholi.
Weber onsidered the state of a soiety when religious beliefs are universal and
generally aepted, and soiety is homogeneous with respet to this fator. How-
ever, very often we have a situation in whih religious ommunities exist in a soial
environment that does not aept their beliefs. This situation happens when we
onsider an early stage in the development of religion or a new kind of religion, or a
religious ommunity, fored to exist in a dierent religion (for example, early Chris-
tian ommunities in a pagan environment or Jewish ommunities in an Islami or
Christian soiety). Suh an attitude of the religious ommunity towards the soial
environment an be quite easily desribed within the framework of formal models.
The situation of the antagonisti relationship of the soial environment to a ohe-
sive religious ommunity an be orrelated with the notion of the α-harateristi
funtion. The ase when the soial environment takes a neutral position an be de-
sribed using the δ-harateristi funtion. In these models, it is assumed that the
main goal of the religious ommunity is its survival and its good; the surrounding
soiety and people outside the ommunity are onsidered only as a possible threat
to its existene.
3.2. ζ and η harateristi funtions
However, sine the emergene of Christianity led to the emergene of radial
religious ethis, in whih members of the ommunity have as their goal not only
their good but also the good of those around them, an utterly dierent model is
required to desribe this situation. It should be noted that already at the time of
its birth, the Christian worldview was quite ontraditory in ontent and also it
underwent signiant hanges in history. Therefore, we rst turn our attention to
early Christianity, whih was distinguished by more denite and harsh priniples
than its later forms. In early Christianity, two omponents an be distinguished.
On the one hand, the highest goal is to serve God and the desire for salvation,
whih is understood as the nal parting with earthly reality and the transition to
the kingdom of heaven.
On the other hand, in the organization of earthly life, early Christianity put
forward priniples that were sharply opposed to the natural egoism of people. In the
ethis that Jesus Christ preahed, aording to the gospels, the main priniples were
love for all people without exeption (love thy neighbor as yourself (Matthew 22,
39)) and ministry not so muh to their individual interests as to the interests of all.
In its most omplete form, suh an understanding of the goals of people's lives was
embodied preisely by the early Christians; their ommunities were ommunities
of saints, i.e., people who radially diverged from aepted norms of life. At the
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same time, in the rst period of its development, Christianity met with a hostile
attitude. That is to say, there were small ommunities of Christians who promoted
the equality of all people before God and the servie of the ommon good, not the
good of their personality, and around them there were people who ated against
them, against their ations aimed at the benet of all. It is easy to see that this
form of the ommunity's relationship with the soial environment is dened by
ζ-harateristi funtion.
Over time, the new moral priniples of religion, gaining a more general harater,
lose their ertainty and exatness and remain as ideal norms. However, they no
longer strongly aet real life and beome less eetive. As a result, the distintion
between entities that are members of religious ommunities from those who are not
members of them is diminishing. In the history of Christianity, a radial turning
point ame after it was delared by the emperor Constantine in the 4th entury
the state religion of the Roman Empire. This proess was very learly desribed
by the Russian philosopher of the late 19th entury, Vladimir Solovyov: Under
Constantine the Great and Constane, pagan masses were brought to Christianity
not by onvition, but by slavish imitation or merenary alulation. There was
an unpreedented type of feigned, hyporitial Christians. It multiplied even more
when under Theodosius, and nally under Justinian, paganism was forbidden by
law and < ... > every subjet of the Greo-Roman Empire was foribly obligated to
be a Christian under pain of heavy riminal punishments. < ... > The formerly truly
Christian soiety has spread and disappeared into a Christian by name, but in reality
 a pagan ommunity. The overwhelming majority of superial Christians not only
preserved the pagan priniples of life under a Christian name, but tried in every
way  instintively, and partly also onsiously  to arm alongside Christianity,
legitimize and perpetuate the old pagan order (Solovyev, 1988).
The weakening of the inuene of religion on people's lives means a risis, and
it is realized by people who are beginning to reet on what is wrong in religion
and striving to introdue new ideas into the religion that should give it greater
vitality. Conerning the essene and historial fate of Christianity, the thoughts of
F. Dostoevsky and L. Tolstoy are espeially important. In fat, in the works of two
great Russian writers and philosophers, a new interpretation of Christianity was
developed as a system of priniples that should radially hange people's lives.
Dostoevsky and Tolstoy were equally ritial of traditional hurh Christianity,
whih, in their opinion, has long failed to fulll its role in soiety and did not lead
people and the whole soiety to perfetion. Both writers understood Jesus Christ not
as God embodied in man, but as a man who gives an example of an ideal life for all
people. Aordingly, in the Christian dotrine, the main thing is not the mythology
of atonement for sins through the death of Jesus Christ at Calvary, but simply a
moral example of life in whih a person pursues not his selsh interests, but serves
everyone, i.e., lives for the benet of all, and not for himself. We an say that
Russian thinkers tried to return Christianity to its original, ideal model. Here is
how Dostoevsky wrote about this in a very famous manusript sketh reated on the
day of the death of his rst wife Marya Isaeva: Meanwhile, after the appearane
of Christ as the inarnation ideal of man, it has beome lear that the highest,
the nal development of the personality should lead preisely to the point < ... >
where man nds, realizes and beome onvined with all the strength of his nature
that the highest use whih man an make of his personality, of the fullness of the
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development of his I, is as it were to destroy that I, to give it over wholly to eah and
everyone, wholeheartedly and selessly. This is the greatest happiness. < ... > This
is preisely the paradise of Christ. All history, both of humanity and to some extent
of eah person separately, is only development, struggle, striving, and attainment
of this goal (Tolstaya, 2013).
Aording to the traditional Christian onvitions that the Christian hurh
prolaims, the highest goal of life for all people is the kingdom of heaven, this
being outside of earthly reality, where a person annot ahieve an ideal state. In
ontrast, Dostoevsky argues that the true meaning of Christianity is to ahieve an
ideal, perfet state in earthly reality itself, in the history of mankind, by hanging
the moral priniples of people. Dostoevsky alls this perfet state the paradise
of Christ, beause it an only be ahieved if people live aording to the moral
priniples that Christ prolaimed: to love others as himself and even more than
himself, and to serve not his own interests, but the interests of others. This means
that every person must beome ompletely like Christ, as he is depited in the
gospels. Dostoevsky speaks about this many times in his works. Here is the most
expliit quote on this subjet from the preparatory materials for the novel Demons:
If people had not the slightest idea about the state and about any sienes, but
would have been all like Christ, is it possible that there would be no heaven on
earth right now so? (Dostoevsky, 1974). One of the main ideologial harater of
Dostoevsky, the Orthodox elder Zosima, in the novel The Brothers Karamazov
says about the opportunity to reah heaven on earth: life is paradise, and we are
all in paradise, but we won't see it; if we would, we should have heaven on earth
the next day (Dostoevsky, 1994).
The same tendeny to understanding Christianity is present in the later works
of Leo Tolstoy. He very sharply ritiizes hurh dotrine for distorting the true
teahings of Jesus Christ, for the fat that it replaed the real earthly goals of
life with some unreal, heavenly ones. Tolstoy argues that the essene of Christ's
teahings is to demonstrate the lifestyle that will inevitably lead all people, the
whole soiety to an ideal state, to paradise on earth. Tolstoy speaks about this,
for example, in the work What is my faith?: The kingdom of God upon earth
onsists in this, that all men should be at peae with one another. < ... > Peae
among men is the greatest blessing that an exist upon this earth, and it is within
reah of all men. < ... > The whole dotrine of Jesus has but one objet, to establish
peae - the kingdom of God  among men (Tolstoy, 1885).
In the treatise On Life, Tolstoy ontrasts the majority of ordinary people who
pursue their selsh goals or, as he denotes, the goals of their animal personality,
and those who follow the teahings of Christ. The life of man as an individual,
striving only for his own welfare amid an innite number of similar individuals de-
stroying eah other and destroying themselves, is an evil and absurdity - and the
true life annot be suh (Tolstoy, 1934, p. 20). And further about the same: For
an animal whih has not reasonable onsiousness to show it the wrethedness and
niteness of its existene, the welfare of its personality (and the resulting ontinu-
ation of the speies) is the highest aim of life. But for man personality is not life,
it is merely the stage of his existene at whih he disovers the true good of life 
whih does not oinide with the good of his personality  (Tolstoy, 1934, p. 68).
Tolstoy believes that the path of true life onsists in a radial denial of the natural
egoism of an isolated individual and in unonditionally following the priniple of
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love for others and serving them: the greatest good - and one apable of being
innitely inreased - for every being an be ahieved only by this law of devotion
of eah to all and aordingly of all to eah (Tolstoy, 1934, p. 77). The dierene
between Tolstoy's point of view and Dostoevsky's point of view is that he highlights
the onept of serving others as the priniple of non-resistane to evil by violene
beause he believes that it is the violene ommitted by people against eah other
that primarily separates them and does not allow to love the other as himself.
At the same time, both Dostoevsky and Tolstoy believed that membership in the
oial hurh does not at all make people ommitted to the ideal of Christ; there
are very few people living in aordane with this ideal, and they are usually not
assoiated with the hurh. This was espeially emphasized by Tolstoy, who laimed
that these best people often do not even know the name of Christ, but in their life,
they intuitively follow his ommandments: Fortunately there is a remnant, made up
of the noblest minds of the age, who are not ontented with this religion <Churh>,
but have an entirely dierent faith with regard to what the life of man ought to be.
< ... > These people, as a general thing, know little of the dotrine of Jesus; they
do not understand it, and, like their adversaries, they refuse to aept the leading
priniple of the religion of Jesus, whih is to resist not evil; often they have nothing
but a hatred for the name of Jesus; but their whole faith with regard to what life
ought to be is unonsiously based upon the humane and eternal truths omprised
in the Christian dotrine. This remnant, in spite of alumny and perseution, are the
only ones who do not tamely submit to the orders of the rst omer. Consequently,
they are the only ones in these days who live a reasonable and not an animal life,
the only ones who have faith (Tolstoy, 1885).
Finally, it an be noted that the same idea of the ideal of universal development
and the purpose of human history was formulated by the Frenh philosopher Henri
Bergson in the book Two Soures of Morality and Religion (1932). He argued that
history is determined by those people who in their lives follow the ideal of evangelial
ethis, that is, the same priniples of life that we just spoke about in onnetion with
the interpretation of Christianity by Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. Bergson onsidered
the main thing in this ethi to be love for all people, for all humanity, ontrary
to that personal and national egoism, whih is the property of all ordinary people.
Aording to Bergson, just as there were brilliant people who pushed the boundaries
of the mind and the same individuals were oasionally provided muh more than
they ould immediately give sight, so also gifted souls appeared who felt like kindred
to all souls, and instead of to remain within the boundaries of the group and be
limited by the solidarity established by nature, in a rush of love rushed to humanity
as a whole (Bergson, 1932, p. 102).
Bergson believed that it was Jesus Christ, who most fully expressed the ideal
of a perfet soiety as a soiety where everyone loves everyone and serves every-
one. Nevertheless, he, like Tolstoy, did not onsider historial Christianity and the
Christian hurh to be onsistent with this ideal. Absolute morality, about whih
he speaks, existed before the advent of Christianity and exists rather outside the
Christian hurh today. It is those who follow this morality do determine the future
of mankind: ... the great moral personalities who left a mark in history extend
their hands to eah other through the enturies, through our human ities; together
they form a divine ity where they invite us to enter. We may not hear their voies
distintly, but the ry is nevertheless ast, and something answers him in the depths
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of our souls. < ... > they attrat us into an ideal soiety at the very time when we
yield to the pressure of a real soiety (Bergson, 1932, p. 72).
In aordane with the thoughts of Russian writers and Bergson, soiety onsists
of the majority of people who think mainly about their own good, and a small
group of saints who realize the ideal of Christ as the pursuit of good for everyone
and everybody. This model is easy to formalize using the η-harateristi funtion.
Although usually soiety is represented dierently, with the help of more pragmati
eonomi, politial, soial models, great thinkers argue that it is preisely suh a
model that we must rst bear in mind if we want to orretly understand the highest
and true goal of the historial development of mankind. If we assume in this model
that the number of saints inluded in the group S is ontinuously inreasing, it
will be possible to desribe the movements of human soiety to an ideal state, to
heaven on earth.
4. Conlusion
In this paper, an attempt is made to ompare mathematial models orrespond-
ing to dierent methods of onstruting a harateristi funtion in a ooperative
game, and models of soial philosophy that explain various models of interation
between soial groups and soiety.
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